![]() Radicalization and extremism become more likely. Combined with repressive government responses and corruption, such unrest leads to state fragility. A real decline in income, quality of life, and access to healthcare for a large number of people leaves a country vulnerable to political unrest. 14 If allowed to spiral out of control, these new challenges could become geostrategic threats. The coronavirus and its aftermath has exacerbated known conflict drivers, negatively impacting human rights while increasing unemployment and economic inequalities. 12 Whether rich or poor, all states in the region have redirected societal resources to combat Covid‐19. 11 They also face the same regional and ”transnational“ threats, including terrorism, state fragility, and religious radicalism and sectarianism. While the 22 countries that make up the Arab world are vastly different in terms of resilience and resources for a post‐Covid rebound, they share a history and political culture of authoritarianism, sectarianism, and military kleptocracy. 9 In effect, governments tightened their grip on society without providing needed political reforms, educational opportunities, or health and human services. 8 In order to avoid a similar fate, other MENA governments responded by crushing legitimate political participation and the freedom of the press. In addition, the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, continued threats from Salafi‐Jihadi extremism, massive displacement and humanitarian crises, sectarianism, and rising inequalities between the rich and the extremely poor 7 left much of the region vulnerable to political, religious, and social instability. 5 As a result, in February 2019, most of the region's 435 million residents found themselves in countries with inadequate or nonexistent health services, where jobs in the formal economy were scarce, and incomes unreliable. 3 In fact, the Arab world is the only region where poverty increased after 2011, 4 while access to health care, social services, economic opportunities, and education continued to decline. Living conditions continued to dwindle while inequalities rose, benefiting the political elites and further marginalizing the middle class and the poor. ![]() Following the uprisings in 2011, very few governments did anything to address the grievances that drove a generation of young Arabs into the streets. 2ĭue to a decade of socioeconomic and political decline after the Arab Spring, the region already suffered from pre‐existing conditions and risk factors. 1 While the region is expected to rebound quickly, the economic and social “scars” of the pandemic may remain longer than in other regions, as impacts have disproportionally affected communities already at risk. Iraq, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates have reported the highest number of cases, while Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco have suffered the largest share of fatalities. By July 1, 2020, close to 6.5 million Covid‐19 cases had been confirmed in the MENA region, with more than 100,000 deaths. The coronavirus was relatively late to take hold in the Middle East and North Africa, but its impact, as predicted, came swiftly. Given the lack of economic resilience and the significant fragility of many Arab states, as well as the availability of advanced military technology in the region, the resulting political, socioeconomic, humanitarian, and security challenges could be devastating. The civil wars in Syria and Yemen, continued threats from Salafi‐Jihadi extremism, massive displacement, sectarianism, and rising inequalities between the rich and the extremely poor are to blame for such fragility. This has increased political instability, which, in turn, makes violence more likely. ![]() While the pandemic has not led to a significant rise in terrorism and extremist violence, it has worsened fragility and accelerated economic decline. The region will likely face a growing regional‐security dilemma compounded by challenges that are now too familiar: the further entrenchment of political authoritarianism, violent sectarian conflicts, regional rivalries, and the radicalization and recruitment efforts by terrorist and extremist groups. In particular, it focuses on the “pre‐existing conditions” for instability in the Middle East, and the opportunity that the pandemic might have to exacerbate them. This article analyzes the underlying human insecurities and changing geopolitical alliances in the Middle East during the past decade to assess the most likely short‐ and medium‐term impacts of Covid‐19 on the global security environment.
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